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INTRODUCTION 
Within the past two decades, there has been a significant 
increase in the number of international investment 
agreements providing for arbitration through the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID).1  This substantial growth in arbitration for 
investor-state disputes has led to concerns that the 
international investment system is business-biased and 
 
 1.  For a description of the Centre and the investor-state dispute process, 
see Background Information on the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) (Jan. 20, 2013), https://icsid.worldbank.org/
apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Documents/ICSID%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20ENGLISH
.pdf [hereinafter Background information on ICSID]. 
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flawed.2  Many powerful global corporations have been accused 
of taking advantage of developing countries through the 
international investment regime.3  Developing countries agree 
to enter into investment agreements with private investors 
from wealthier nations in an effort to encourage foreign 
investment and ideally enhance economic development.4 
However, critics claim that private investors utilize their 
superior bargaining power to negotiate unequal international 
investment treaties that favor the rights of investors.5  These 
controversial international investment agreements protect the 
foreign investment and allegedly afford investors the power to 
sue governments if policy changes are deemed to negatively 
affect investors’ profits.6  Powerful corporate investors are then 
able to seek enforcement of these rights and protections 
through international arbitration tribunals, specifically 
ICSID.7  There are growing concerns that ICSID prioritizes the 
rights and interests of corporate investors8 at the expense of 
the social and environmental goals of the national 
governments and sovereign states.9 
This comment will examine the inherent flaws within the 
current international investment process.  First, this comment 
will present the background information on the foreign direct 
investment process; in general, the development of investment 
agreements and the shortcomings of the various alternative 
investment dispute mechanisms.  This comment will describe 
the structure and purpose of ICSID as an organization 
established under the World Bank.  Next, it will analyze the 
legal problems arising from the foreign investment process 
 
 2.  PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW 
LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION BOOM, 7 (Helen Burley ed., Corporate Eur. Observatory and the 
Transnational Inst. 2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and 
Geneva, Course on Dispute Settlement: International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232, Module 2.1 (Oct. 3, 2003) (by 
Christoph Schreuer), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
edmmisc232overview_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Course] (discussing the 
significance of foreign investment for development). 
 5. SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY, CHALLENGING CORPORATE INVESTOR 
RULE 2 (Inst. for Policy Studies & Food and Water Watch eds., 2007). 
 6. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 2, at 7. 
 7. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 2. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 10. 
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today, which arguably favors corporate investors.  This 
discussion will include criticism on the unequal international 
investment regime beginning with the creation of lopsided 
investment agreements, which are then enforced by a partial 
arbitration process.  Finally, this comment will propose 
possible improvements for the international investment 
process to eliminate bias and provide investors and host states 
with a mutual confidence in ICSID as an impartial system for 
the settlement of investment disputes. 
I. BACKGROUND  
A. Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a process by which a 
private company or entity invests in a business enterprise in 
another country, typically a developing country.10  FDI 
potentially benefits both parties involved.  While the investor 
profits from the expanded market and production networks, 
FDI also plays an important role for the developing country by 
enhancing economic development.11  Foreign investment 
provides a developing country access to several options vital for 
development, such as capital, financing and technology.12  
These options can contribute to the improvement of a host 
country’s infrastructure, provide employment opportunities 
and promote the welfare of their people.13 
Before the 1960s, foreign investors were forced to comply 
with a variety of domestic government regulations to help 
ensure that the investment provided benefits to the host 
country.14  For example, “foreign investors were subjected to . . . 
regulations, such as tariff protection, domestic content 
requirements, capital controls or controls on repatriation and 
other rules . . . .”15  Investors, opposed to these constraints that 
protected the domestic industries, created international 
 
 10. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 5. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Omar E. García-Bolívar, Defining an ICSID Investment: Why Economic 
Development Should be the Core Element, 2 INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, April, 
13, 2012 http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/defining-an-icsid-investment-why-
economic-development-should-be-the-core-element/ (explaining the intentions of 
states in international investment law). 
 14. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 4. 
 15. Id. 
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investment agreements to heighten the protections of their 
investment to ultimately maximize their profit.16 
B. International Investment Agreements 
Today, international investment agreements, specifically 
either bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or free trade 
agreements (FTAs), predominantly govern foreign direct 
investments in developing countries.  BITs are agreements 
between states that determine the terms and conditions for 
private foreign investors in the jurisdiction of another 
country.17  FTAs, such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and the Central America Free Trade Agreement, 
are agreements that include chapters that provide for investor 
protections.18 FTAs can be bilateral agreements, between two 
states, or multilateral agreements, between more than two 
states.19 
International investment agreements began to emerge in 
the 1960s to provide greater protection for private investments 
under international law.20  “The focus of the initial period of 
growth of investment treaties was singular: the protection of 
investor rights in foreign states.”21  Investors consider various 
factors when pursuing an overseas investment including “the 
host country’s reputation, the profitability of a venture, low 
labor costs, availability of natural resources, tax advantages, 
etc.”22  In addition to these factors, potential host countries 
offer international legal guarantees to investors through 
international investment agreements such BITs and FTAs.23 
These agreements typically grant investors broad privileges by 
including provisions that govern four substantive areas: FDI 
admission, “fair and equitable treatment” to an investment, 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Zachery Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing 
for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 2008 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 265, 266 (2008). 
 18. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 3. 
 19.  Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 1. 
 20. Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role 
in Sustainable Development, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 523 (2013). 
 21. Id. at 524. 
 22. Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime 
and Its Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 953, 
957 (2007). 
 23. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
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adequate compensation for expropriation, and the settlement 
of disputes in international tribunals.24 
By signing a BIT or FTA, the host government makes a 
credible commitment to treat foreign investors fairly.  The 
enhanced security of a BIT and FTA is helpful as “a 
‘confidence-building’ measure that sends a green light to the 
private investment community.”25  Accordingly, governments 
with little credibility will sign BITs to give them a competitive 
advantage by reducing the risk of investing. Therefore, 
developing countries competing for foreign capital have a 
strong incentive to enter into foreign investment agreements.26 
C. Alternative Methods of Investment Dispute Settlement 
An important aspect of the legal protection of foreign 
investments is the settlement of disputes between host states 
and foreign investors.27  Therefore, when a dispute arises, a 
mechanism providing for an impartial and effective dispute 
settlement is a necessary element to protect both parties’ 
rights.28  Until the creation of ICSID, the following methods 
available for the settlement of investment disputes were 
arguably inadequate.29 
1. Domestic Court of Host State 
In the absence of other previously agreed upon 
arrangements for the settlement of the investment dispute, the 
host state’s domestic courts will commonly be employed to 
resolve the dispute.30  However, from the investor’s 
 
 24. See ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 3. The terms “Fair and 
Equitable Treatment” are not defined and are thus subjective, providing 
arbitrators with broad discretion to interpret the meaning.  Additionally, 
provisions granting adequate compensation if an investment is expropriated 
protects investors from either a physical taking of property, as well as 
government actions and regulations that reduce the value of a foreign 
investment. 
 25. Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of 
the Neoliberal Contagion, 7 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 85, 107 (1999)(quoting Jeswald W. 
Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24:3 THE INT’L LAWYER 
655, 661 (1990)). 
 26. Chung, supra note 22, at 957. 
 27. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 6. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 7. 
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perspective, investment dispute settlement in the host state’s 
court is disadvantageous. First, investors claim that the host 
states’ courts lack impartiality because they fail to offer 
sufficient guarantees to protect the foreign investor.31  For 
example, domestic courts are bound by domestic law.32  
Accordingly, the domestic law of the host state will be applied 
even if the investor’s rights would otherwise be protected 
under international law.33  Also, investors claim that the 
regular domestic courts are unable to provide the advanced 
technical expertise required for the equitable resolution of 
complex international investment disputes.34 
2. Domestic Court of Other State 
Investment disputes can also potentially be settled in 
domestic courts of the investor’s states.35  Parties can agree to 
a choice of forum clause pointing to either the investor’s 
domestic court or the court of a third state.36  However, this 
type of dispute settlement is not usually a realistic option.37  
Regardless of an agreed upon choice of forum clause, the 
domestic courts of other states typically lack territorial 
jurisdiction over the investment operations; “sovereign 
immunity or other judicial doctrines will usually make such 
proceedings impossible.”38 
3. Diplomatic Protection 
Diplomatic protection is another method used in the 
settlement of investment disputes.  Because foreign investors 
regard the host state’s domestic court as inadequate for the 
settlement of the investor-state dispute, foreign investors can 
rely on their home country to exercise diplomatic protection.39  
Diplomatic protection is a means for the investor’s home state 
to take action against the host state in pursuit of the investor’s 
claim.40  However, this method of dispute resolution also has 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 7. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Contra id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 7. 
 40. Id. 
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several disadvantages.41  First, diplomatic protection is 
discretionary and the investor does not have an automatic 
right to employ this method of resolution.42  Secondly, the 
investor is required to have exhausted all local remedies in the 
host state without a satisfactory result before this process is 
even a possibility.43  This prerequisite is intended to reduce the 
number of international claims and to avoid the developed 
country’s involvement by providing the host country an 
opportunity to remedy the foreign investor’s claims.44 
Additionally, diplomatic protection can potentially affect 
the political relations between the two countries involved in 
the dispute.45  For example, some developed countries have 
been accused of exercising diplomatic protection, specifically 
by applying political pressure and threatening economic 
boycotts, before the exhaustion of local remedies.46  Diplomatic 
protection, therefore, changes the investor-state dispute to a 
political dispute between the host country and the home 
country, and may result in tense international relations.47 
4. Ad Hoc Arbitration 
Another alternative for investment dispute settlement is 
ad hoc arbitration between the host state and the foreign 
investor.48  Ad hoc arbitration is a form of arbitration that is 
not supported by a particular arbitration institution.49  While 
ad hoc arbitration permits the parties to tailor the arbitration 
process to the specific facts of their dispute, ad hoc arbitration 
lacks institutional support, which creates a number of 
procedural disadvantages and inefficiencies.50  For example, 
once the parties have agreed on ad hoc arbitration, they are 
required to create an arbitration agreement that regulates 
several procedural issues.51  The parties must agree on the 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Chen Huiping, The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Where 
to Go in the 21st Century?, 9 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 467, 469 (2008). 
45.  Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 7. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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location and language of the arbitration, the applicable law, 
and the selection of arbitrators.52 
As the shortcomings of the existing structures available 
for the settlement of investment dispute became increasingly 
apparent, the World Bank created an initiative in the 1960s to 
provide an effective and impartial alternative for investment 
dispute settlement between host states and foreign investors.53 
D. ICSID as an Investor-State Dispute Mechanism 
1. World Bank’s Purpose and Structure 
The primary purpose of the World Bank is to end poverty 
and encourage shared prosperity by “promot[ing] 
environmental and social sustainability, and to pursue a 
fiscally responsible development path.”54  The Bank operates 
as a form of democracy as the member nations are represented 
in the Board of Executive Directors.55  The president of the 
World Bank is a citizen from the Bank’s largest shareholder 
member and governs the five separate institutions currently 
established under the Bank.56  In 1966, the World Bank 
created the independent international institution, the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, to provide facilities for the conciliation and 
arbitration of international investment disputes.57 
2. Purpose of ICSID 
ICSID’s founding documents reveal three main purposes 
the institution seeks to achieve.58  First, ICSID was established 
to protect foreign investment through the facilitation of 
investment dispute settlement.59  Secondly, the ICSID 
Convention seeks to promote investment flows to Third World 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 9. 
 54. See Corporate Responsibility, THE WORLD BANK (visited Mar. 2014), 
https://crinfo.worldbank.org/wbcrinfo/node/6 (stating the World Bank’s mission is 
to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity). 
 55. Jennifer N. Weidner, World Bank Study, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 
193 (2001). 
 56. Id. at 197. 
 57. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 1. 
 58. See Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of 
ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345, 357 (2006–2007). 
 59. Id. at 358. 
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states.60  According to the ICSID Report, guaranteeing 
investment protection by providing a mechanism for investor-
state arbitration “would provide additional inducement and 
stimulate a larger flow of private international investment into 
its territories, which is the primary purpose of the 
Convention.”61  Therefore, ICSID was established under the 
belief that protecting foreign investors would facilitate 
investment flows, and as a result, enhance economic 
development in Third World countries.62 
Furthermore, ICSID’s third goal is to provide an 
“atmosphere of mutual confidence” for investors and host 
countries.63  This third purpose incorporates both of the first 
two purposes because “[t]he creation of an institution designed 
to facilitate the settlement of disputes between States and 
foreign investors can be a major step toward promoting an 
atmosphere of mutual confidence and thus stimulating a larger 
flow of private international capital into those countries which 
wish to attract it.”64 
3. Evolution of ICSID 
Although ICSID’s mechanisms were rarely employed for 
the first thirty years of its existence, the Convention’s caseload 
has increased dramatically in the last fifteen years.65  This 
increase is a result of the substantial growth of foreign 
investments coupled with the rising number of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and other international investment 
agreements providing for arbitration proceedings for the 
investor-state dispute settlement.66  International investment 
agreements commonly protect investor’s rights by providing 
access to direct remedies in international tribunals.67  There 
are several international tribunals and rules that can be 
employed to resolve claims arising out of the investment, such 
as the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 5 I.L.M. 524 
¶ 12 (Mar. 18, 1965) [hereinafter ICSID Report]. 
 62. Odumosu, supra note 58, at 359. 
 63. Id. 
 64. ICSID Report, supra note 61, ¶ 9. 
 65. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 3. 
 66. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 4. 
 67. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 5, at 3. 
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Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC).68 
Today, the majority of investment agreements provide for 
ICSID arbitration, as ICSID was specifically established to 
facilitate the arbitration of disputes between states and 
investors.69  As of June 2013, ICSID had registered a total of 
433 cases under the ICSID Convention.70  Over seventy percent 
of cases established ICSID jurisdiction on the basis of consent 
invoked by international investment agreements.71 
4. Structure of ICSID 
The governing body of ICSID is the ICSID Administrative 
Council.  The Administrative Council is comprised of one 
representative from each member state, with each 
representative having equal voting powers.72  As of December 
31, 2014, the Administrative Council was comprised of 
representatives from 150 Contracting States.73  The chair of 
the Administrative Council is the president of the World Bank 
and has no vote.74  The Administrative Council is responsible 
for electing the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary 
General, adopting the annual budget, adopting the rules and 
regulations for the institution and the procedure for the 
arbitration proceedings, and approving the annual report on 
the Centre’s operation.75   
 The ICSID Secretariat is comprised of a Secretary-
General, one or more Deputy Secretary-Generals, and staff.76  
The Secretariat is responsible for overseeing individual 
disputes on a day-to-day basis, providing institutional support 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics, Issue 2013–2, at 23 (June 30, 
2013), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/2012-
2%20%20-%20English.pdf [hereinafter ICSID, Statistics 2013]. 
 71. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 2.  The remainder of 
ICSID cases established jurisdiction on the basis of Investor-State dispute 
settlement provisions in domestic investment legislation or contracts. 
 72. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, art. VII, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, available 
at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
 73.  Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 1. 
 74. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, art. V. 
 75. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, art. XI. 
 76. Id. art. IX. 
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for the initiation and conduct of ICSID proceedings, assisting 
in the constitution of conciliation commissions, arbitral 
tribunals and ad hoc committees, and administering the 
proceedings and finances of each case.77   
5. Choice of ICSID Dispute Settlement Methods 
There are two possible methods of dispute settlement 
provided by the ICSID Convention: conciliation and 
arbitration.78  Conciliation is designed to assist the parties in 
reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.79  Both parties 
must willingly agree to pursue this method of dispute 
resolution.80  If the parties reach an agreement, the 
Commission creates a report noting the issues in the dispute 
and records the parties’ agreed upon decision.81  Conciliation is 
considered to be a more informal and flexible approach, and 
the report generated as a result of the conciliation is not 
binding on the parties.82 
Arbitration, on the other hand, is a more formal process of 
dispute resolution.83  If the parties fail to reach an agreed 
settlement, the tribunal determines an award that is binding 
and enforceable on both parties.84  The vast majority of cases 
brought under the ICSID Convention use arbitration 
proceedings.85  In a case where the parties have submitted to 
both conciliation and arbitration, the party initiating the 
proceedings decides which method will be used.86  That party 
will typically choose arbitration, as this will ensure the efforts 
and costs of the dispute settlement will result in a binding 
decision.87 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 13. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, art. XXXIV. 
 82. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 13. 
 83.  UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 13. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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6. ICSID Arbitration 
a. Proceedings 
As mentioned above, ICSID specializes in the settlement 
of investment disputes.  Therefore, to be within ICSID’s 
jurisdiction, there must first be a legal dispute arising directly 
out of an investment.88  While the ICSID Convention did not 
define what constitutes an investment, many investment 
agreements will provide a definition of investment.89  Also, the 
ICSID Convention does not contain any substantive rules but 
instead offers a procedure for the settlement of investment 
disputes.90  Pursuant to the ICSID Convention, the tribunals 
are to follow the law agreed upon by the parties.91  However, in 
the absence of an agreed choice of law, the Tribunal shall apply 
the law of the host State, as well as any applicable 
international law.92  International law includes international 
agreements, such as BITs and FTAs, and customary 
international law.93  Also, if authorized by both parties, a 
tribunal has the authority to decide a case ex aequo et bono, 
meaning “on the basis of equity rather than law.”94 
ICSID arbitration proceedings are initiated by the 
submitting a Request for Arbitration to the Secretary-General 
of ICSID.95  The request describes the facts and issues of the 
particular case.96  The next step in the procedure is selecting 
the arbitral tribunal.97  Within sixty days after the tribunal has 
been established, an initial session is held to discuss 
preliminary questions of procedure.98  The proceedings then 
comprise of a written procedure, followed by an in-person oral 
hearing where the parties present their case.99  Subsequently, 
the tribunal will deliberate and render an award.100 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 13. 
 90. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 14. 
 91. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. XLII. 
 92. Id. 
 93. UNCTAD Course, supra note 4, at 14. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 3. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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b. Tribunal Selection 
Independent tribunals decide the international 
investment disputes under ICSID arbitration proceedings.101  
In most instances, the tribunals are comprised of one 
arbitrator appointed by the investor, one arbitrator appointed 
by the state, and one presiding arbitrator, or tribunal 
president, appointed through the consent of both parties.102  
ICSID maintains a list of individuals who may be named as 
arbitrators in ICSID proceedings known as the ICSID Panel of 
Conciliators and of Arbitrators.103 
Each ICSID Member State may designate four arbitrators 
to the Panel and the Chairman of the Administrative Council, 
the president of the World Bank, may designate ten arbitrators 
to the panel.104  While this list provides a useful source from 
which parties may select arbitrators, the parties are not 
obligated to select an arbitrator from the list.105  Parties are 
free to appoint any person they deem suitable who is of “high 
moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, 
commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to 
exercise independent judgment”106 to facilitate in the 
resolution of the dispute. If the parties to a dispute fail to 
appoint conciliators or arbitrators to a tribunal, the Chairman 
of the Administrative Council has the authority to appoint 
conciliators, arbitrators or ad hoc committee members for the 
ICSID proceedings.107 
Before the arbitration proceedings commence, the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules require each arbitrator to sign a declaration 
acknowledging that the arbitrator “shall judge fairly as 
between the parties, according to the applicable law . . . .”108  
Also, each arbitrator is required to attach a written statement 
of any past or present relationships with the parties and any 
other circumstance that may cause doubt as to that particular 
 
 101. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 3. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. XIII. 
 105. Background Information on ICSID, supra note 1, at 3. 
 106. ICSID Convention, supra note 72, at art. XIV(1). 
 107. Id. at art. XXXIX. 
 108. ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, R.6(2) (Mar. 18, 
1965), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/
CRR_English-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules]. 
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arbitrator’s reliability for independent judgment.109  
Additionally, arbitrators have a continuing obligation to 
investigate any conflict of interest that may arise throughout 
the proceedings.110  A party may propose to disqualify an 
arbitrator on the grounds that the particular arbitrator lacks 
the qualities required and therefore is ineligible for 
appointment to the Tribunal.111 
c. Confidentiality 
The ICSID Rules specifically provide for confidentiality 
with regards to the proceedings. Each arbitrator is required to 
sign a declaration that he will keep all information regarding 
the arbitration proceedings and contents of any award 
confidential.112  Also, only the members of the Tribunal, the 
parties, and the parties’ agents, counsel, witnesses and experts 
may be present at the hearings.113  In 2006, ICSID amended 
the rules of the Convention to permit third parties to attend 
oral hearings upon consent by both parties.114  Lastly, only the 
Tribunal is permitted to participate in the deliberations, 
unless the Tribunal decides otherwise, and “the deliberations 
of the Tribunal shall take place in private and remain 
secret.”115 
Pursuant to the ICSID Convention, the tribunal is 
prohibited from publishing the award without the consent of 
the parties.116  However, the Centre typically obtains the 
consent of the parties for such publication.117  The ICSID Rules 
previously provided ICSID Tribunals with discretion to 
publish excerpts of awards that revealed the Tribunal’s legal 
reasoning behind their decision.118 In an effort to increase 
transparency, the 2006 amended rules now require ICSID to 
“promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal 
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reasoning of the Tribunal.”119 Therefore, the 2006 amendments 
make the reasoning behind the tribunal’s holding more 
accessible to the public.120  However, consent by both parties is 
nonetheless still required for the publication of the award.121 
The ICSID Rules are silent regarding whether the parties 
to a proceeding have an implied duty of confidentiality.122  In 
one dispute, the Tribunal held that “both parties should 
refrain, in their own interest, from doing anything that could 
aggravate or exacerbate the dispute.”123  However, tribunals 
have acknowledged that under the ICSID Rules, parties are 
allowed to freely disseminate any information relevant to the 
arbitration proceedings.124  Accordingly, parties to 
international arbitration will often contract for confidentiality 
in investment agreements, thereby adding protections beyond 
the rules of the arbitral tribunal.125 
d. Awards 
Pursuant to Article 53 of the ICSID Convention, “[e]ach 
party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the  
award . . . .”126  Therefore, ICSID awards are binding and final 
and the award debtor is obligated to comply.127 Pecuniary 
obligations arising from awards are to be enforced like final 
domestic judgments in all Member States of the Convention.128  
Accordingly, recognition and enforcement may be sought either 
in the host state, in the investor’s state, or in any state that is 
a party to the ICSID Convention.129 
The procedure for the enforcement and execution of the 
award is “governed by the laws concerning the execution of 
judgments in force in the State where such execution is 
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sought.”130  ICSID awards are not subject to scrutiny by 
domestic courts.131  As a result, a domestic court is not 
permitted to examine jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal, 
procedure, or substantive validity of an award.132 
After an award is rendered, the parties may request an 
interpretation, revision, or annulment of the award.133  The 
ICSID Convention offers its own system for review by which a 
party may seek annulment of the award by an ad hoc 
committee.134  The ad hoc committee consists of three persons, 
appointed by the Chairman of ICSID.135  In accordance with 
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, a party may request 
annulment of the award only on the following conditions: (a) 
the Tribunal was not properly constituted, (b) the Tribunal 
manifestly exceeded its powers, (c) corruption by a Tribunal 
member, (d) a serious departure from a fundamental rule or 
procedure, or (e) the award did not state the reasons for the 
decision.136 
If the ad hoc committee upholds the request for the 
annulment, the original award is invalidated.137  However, the 
ad hoc committee does not have the authority to replace the 
award with a new decision on the merits.138  To receive a valid 
award for that particular claim, the parties must request that 
the dispute be submitted to a new tribunal.139 
II. LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT PROCESS  
The substantial increase in the number of international 
investment agreements has led to a growing concern the 
international investment regime is adverse to developing 
countries. Foreign direct investment is essential for enhancing 
economic development in developing countries.140  However, in 
the competition to attract investment, developing countries are 
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in a disadvantaged bargaining position during the investment 
agreement negotiation process.141  As a result of these unequal 
investment agreements, developing countries are not receiving 
the potential benefits of the foreign direct investment 
process.142 
Additionally, foreign investors often request to include a 
provision in the investment agreement stipulating that ICSID 
shall govern the resolution of any dispute arising out of an 
investment.143  Because ICSID was established under the belief 
that protecting foreign investors would facilitate investment 
and ultimately enhance economic development in Third World 
countries, there is a concern that ICSID dispute settlement 
inequitably prioritizes the protection of investors’ rights 
regardless of any potentially adverse consequences on the 
developing country. 
As developing countries begin to question the legitimacy 
of the international investment process as a biased system 
favoring investors, they will seek ways to avoid the 
international investment regime.144  In 2012, Venezuela 
became the third country, following Ecuador and Bolivia, to 
have denounced its membership from ICSID.145  Venezuela’s 
exit from ICSID signals the growing loss of faith in the system 
and raises questions about the Convention’s legitimacy and 
purpose to provide an unbiased investment dispute resolution 
forum.146  Accordingly, there are concerns “that other states 
will follow suit, which could result in the collapse of the current 
international investment system.”147  Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela’s withdrawal from ICSID demonstrates that 
changes are imperative to prevent the current international 
investment regime from potential collapse. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Criticism of International Investment Agreements 
1. Unequal Bargaining Power 
With the recognition of FDI’s importance as a significant 
means of financing development, many developing countries 
have worked to increase their chances of attracting 
investments.148  However, in the competition to attract 
investment, developing countries are allegedly coerced into 
forfeiting concerns about economic sovereignty and capital 
controls in exchange for greater incentives to investors.149  
Because the market for foreign direct investment in developing 
countries is competitive, potential host countries often concede 
many of their rights to the investor in an effort to out bid other 
competitors.150 
Consequently, the winner of the investment has typically 
relinquished all possible benefits of the foreign investment 
that would have aided in the development and promotion of the 
welfare of their people.151  “The benefits to the country 
generated by the investment (in the form of employment, 
technology transfers, tax revenues, and so on) [would] be offset 
by the incentives and concessions that were needed to attract 
the firm (tax breaks, reduced pollution controls, relaxed 
employment regulations, and so on).”152  Therefore, developing 
countries are in a disadvantaged position when negotiating 
investment agreements and are often pressured to acquiesce to 
investor’s demands, gaining very little if anything from the 
investment.153 
2. Broad Rights of Investors 
Investors, through their superior bargaining power, are 
able to successfully protect their interests during the 
investment agreement negotiation.154  Thus, investment 
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agreements have grown to impose broad obligations on the 
host country thereby inviting a wide variety of investor 
claims.155  The broad, open-ended definitions included in 
investment agreements subject host states to claims they did 
not anticipate at the time they entered into the treaty.156 
A case is within the jurisdiction of ICSID only if both 
parties consent to the Centre’s jurisdiction in writing and only 
if the dispute directly arises out of an investment.157  The 
ICSID Convention, however, fails to provide any definition of 
what constitutes an “investment” or “investor.”158  In the 
absence of definitions, these concepts have been given wide and 
open-ended meanings and have resulted in the protection of a 
variety of activities in a large number of economic fields.159  To 
interpret these terms, many ICSID tribunals turn to the 
language used in the governing treaties.160  The language 
incorporated in the treaties is also commonly broad leaving 
much room for interpretation by the arbitrators.161  For 
example, the U.S. Model BIT defines an investment as “every 
asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, 
that has the characteristics of an investment, including such 
characteristics as the commitment of capital or other 
resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption 
of risk.”162 
An ICSID case, Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine,163 demonstrates 
the problems that can arise from an open-ended and broad 
definition.  In this ICSID case, the investor-claimant, Tokios 
Tokelés, was a wholly owned subsidiary established in Ukraine 
by a Lithuanian company.164  When Tokios Tokelés submitted 
its dispute with Ukraine to ICSID, Ukraine objected to 
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jurisdiction.165  Ukraine contended that the Tokios Tokelés was 
not a foreign investor because Ukrainian nationals owned 
ninety-nine percent of outstanding shares in Tokios Tokelés 
and comprised two-thirds of the management.166  However, the 
Ukraine-Lithuania BIT broadly defined investor as “any entity 
established in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania in 
conformity with its laws and regulations.”167  Therefore, 
because the Ukrainian subsidiary was incorporated under the 
laws of Lithuania, the ICSID Tribunal concluded the 
Lithuanian company was an investor within the meaning of 
the BIT’s definition.168 This language that both parties agreed 
to in the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT is broader than the language 
provided in the majority of other treaties.169  However, this case 
serves as an example of the consequences of open-ended 
definitions in a treaty.170 
B. Criticism of the ICSID Arbitration System 
1. Biased Tribunals 
Critics allege that biased arbitrators decide investor-state 
dispute settlement cases.171  This claim that ICSID tribunals 
favor investors is attributable to several features inherent in 
the arbitration system.  
a. Small Clique of Arbitrators 
Among the hundreds of people who serve as investment 
arbitrators, there exists a group of fifteen arbitrators who have 
been involved in the majority of investor-state arbitration.172  
This elite group of arbitrators has the heaviest caseload as 
arbitrators in investment-treaty disputes and has handled the 
majority of the biggest cases in terms of award amount being 
claimed.173  The arbitrators most frequently selected to decide 
 
 165. Id. at ¶ 11. 
 166. Id. at ¶ 21. 
 167. Id. at ¶ 18. 
 168. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, ¶ 71 (Apr. 29, 
2004), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?
CaseNo=ARB/02/18&tab=DOC. 
 169. Chung, supra note 22, at 960. 
 170. Id. 
 171. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 2, at 38. 
 172. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 2, at 38. 
 173. Id. 
902 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:55 
cases are men from developed countries.174  Eighty-three 
percent of all cases held at ICSID involve arbitrators from 
Western Europe and North America and only four percent of 
arbitrators are women.175  Therefore, the concentration of cases 
handled by this elite group inevitably creates a significant 
career interest for these arbitrators.176  Also, the reoccurring 
use of the same arbitrators limits the possibility of diverse 
viewpoints and perspectives. 
b. Multiple Roles of Arbitrators 
Furthermore, many of these specialists serving as 
arbitrators also act as advocates in other disputes.177  The 
possibility of serving multiple roles creates a risk of conflict of 
interest and raises doubts about the arbitrator’s independence 
and impartiality.178  For example, an arbitrator may be asked 
to render a decision on an issue he has previously acted as an 
advocate for in a prior case.179  In these situations, an 
arbitrator’s integrity might be compromised, as it is difficult 
for a lawyer to remain neutral when deciding an issue in which 
he has previously argued in support of one side.180  Before the 
arbitration proceedings begin, an arbitrator has a duty to 
disclose any relationship with the parties or any other 
circumstance that might cause doubt as to his ability to remain 
impartial.181  However, these vague disclosure obligations 
permit the arbitrators to act with considerable discretion.182 
c. Lavish Arbitrator Fees 
Arbitrators may lack impartiality as a result of the 
significant financial interest in the existence of investment 
arbitration.183  Unlike judges, arbitrators do not earn a flat 
salary and therefore have a financial stake in the arbitration 
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system.184  Arbitrators’ fees can range anywhere from $375 to 
$700 per hour.185  On average, an arbitrator earns $350,000 per 
case.186 Earnings could be far greater depending on where the 
arbitration takes place, the case’s length, and the case’s 
complexity.187  ICSID has capped the amount of fees an 
arbitrator can earn at $3000 per day of work.188  However, the 
fee amount an arbitrator earns on a particular case is 
potentially correlated to the substantive outcome of their 
decisions.189  For example, decisions finding a lack of arbitral 
jurisdiction will likely result in no fees for the arbitrator.190  
Therefore, when asked to rule on jurisdiction of the case, or 
disqualify themselves due to a conflict of interest, arbitrators 
are necessarily required to act contrary to their own financial 
interest.191  Disclosing a conflict of interest or narrowing the 
standard of permitted cases under ICSID could result in the 
loss of thousands of dollars in potential fees.192  Accordingly, 
arbitrators have a strong incentive to expand the 
interpretation of investment rules to increase the number of 
cases falling under ICSID jurisdiction. 
d. Arbitrators Favor Investors to Promote 
Investments 
Because the majority of arbitrators come from developed 
countries,193 it is likely they will have a biased viewpoint 
towards the corporate world thus favoring the protection of 
investors’ profits. As mentioned above, arbitrators have a 
significant financial interest in the arbitration system. Given 
the fact that investors initiate the majority of ICSID claims, 
arbitrators might strategically rule in favor of the investor to 
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promote an increased caseload.194 
Also, “the primary purpose behind the creation of ICSID 
was the promotion of foreign investment.”195  “The Report of 
the Executive Directors on the Convention emphasized 
promoting global economic development through private 
international investment.”196  Therefore, under the belief that 
protecting foreign investments would facilitate investment 
flows and enhance economic development in Third World 
countries,197 arbitrators have an incentive to favor the 
protection of investors’ rights to encourage the growth of 
international investment. 
e. Inadequate Qualification Requirements 
Under the current rules, a person is qualified to be an 
arbitrator if they possess a “high moral character and 
recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry 
or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent 
judgment.”198  To be qualified as an arbitrator, a person is not 
required to be registered anywhere or possess any legal 
training.199  This provision was written to ensure arbitrators 
met the necessary qualifications envisioned for commercial 
disputes.200  However, as public interests have become 
increasingly prevalent in international law, other legal 
disputes commonly arise out of an investment.201  ICSID 
arbitrators are therefore not always qualified to address 
human rights and environmental questions arising out of an 
investment dispute.202 
2. Lack of Transparency 
One of the most controversial aspects of international 
arbitration is the confidential protection afforded to parties 
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before ICSID.203  ICSID arbitration is a matter of contract 
between the parties involved in the dispute.204  Therefore, it is 
arguably reasonable for the parties involved in the proceedings 
to assume that the public should be excluded from the 
proceedings.205  Accordingly, the ICSID Arbitration Rules 
create a presumption in favor of confidentiality.206 
There are some arguments to support the concept of 
confidentiality in arbitration proceedings.  By choosing 
arbitration as opposed to judicial proceedings, parties have 
thereby rejected public courts and have elected to keep their 
dispute private.207  One of the primary reasons parties claim 
they elect to settle their dispute through arbitration is the 
confidentiality protection.208  Therefore, rescinding 
confidentiality is potentially detrimental to the arbitration 
process, as arbitration proceedings would inevitably become 
more like traditional litigation.209  Also, many foreign investors 
claim, “that confidentiality is necessary to protect intellectual 
property, trade secrets, or business information that may be 
disclosed as part of the arbitration proceedings.”210  Investors 
argue that removing confidentiality protections would cause 
public disclosure of private technical data.211 
However, while confidentiality does provide some benefits 
to investor-state dispute resolution, there are also several 
arguments for transparency in investment arbitration 
proceedings.  First, confidentiality protects the arbitrators by 
concealing the proceedings and award from public scrutiny.212  
This lack of historical information about each arbitrator 
hinders the parties from selecting the most appropriate and 
qualified arbitrator for the particular dispute in question.213  
Also, without access to prior award information, there is no 
precedent, thereby making it difficult for the parties to predict 
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the outcome of their dispute.214 “When awards are not 
published, it is difficult to analyze how the law is applied.”215  
International arbitrators may therefore be applying the law 
inconsistently creating an uncertainty in international 
business transactions.216 
Because the “lack of transparency . . . inhibits the creation 
of precedent in international law,” arbitral proceedings are 
arguably less efficient.217  For example, a party is more likely 
to settle if the outcome of the dispute was more predictable.218  
Furthermore, the unpredictability of international business 
transactions complicates business planning when considering 
investment in a particular country.219  Businesses pursuing 
international investment are unable to accurately set prices 
and allocate risk without any certainty as to the law governing 
their particular deal.220 
Even though a tribunal’s award would not carry 
precedential value, the case would carry persuasive weight 
with other arbitral tribunals resolving similar claims.221  
However, the process of arbitration is not intended to apply 
beyond only the particular facts and circumstances of the 
instant case.222  Parties consenting to arbitration have chosen 
this method despite the lack of predictability that may be 
afforded in a court decision with more developed bodies of 
law.223 
Critics allege that the confidentiality rules of ICSID harm 
the legitimacy of the institution itself.224  Because of ICSID’s 
structure and association with the World Bank, parties may be 
skeptical of the tribunal’s reliability in rendering an objective 
decision given the Bank’s close relations with large 
corporations.225  The “requirement that an award [shall] not be 
published without the consent of the parties will limit the 
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public’s access to the award and contribute to the mystification 
of ICSID.”226  Parties new to the ICSID convention may 
attribute “ICSID’s reluctance to publish awards . . . to the 
unreliability of the tribunals’ decisions.”227  This uncertainty 
concerning the integrity of the process could weaken public 
acceptance of arbitral tribunals’ awards and operations.228 
Additionally, investor-state disputes, compared to 
traditional international commercial arbitration, justify the 
need for transparency for the arbitration proceedings and 
award.  Unlike traditional international commercial 
arbitrations, investor-state disputes involve governments as 
parties.  The confidentiality protections might limit scrutiny of 
government decision-making.229  “Democratically elected 
governments are accountable to their electorate and should 
come under scrutiny in the political process if they are engaged 
in conduct contrary to their international obligations.”230  
Investor-state disputes involve issues that must be decided in 
accordance with a treaty or public international law.231  The 
results of these decisions could potentially have a significant 
effect extending beyond the two parties involved in the dispute.  
Therefore, it is inappropriate to conduct confidential 
arbitrations involving public interests.232 
Moreover, confidential awards could “undermine, and 
perhaps even reverse . . . legislative victories that have 
provid[ed] legal protection for the rights of these 
communities.”233  As discussed above, foreign direct investment 
is important for economic development in developing 
countries.234  Therefore, the government’s need to maintain a 
reputation as an attractive environment for foreign investors 
inevitably weakens the government’s bargaining power.235  
Thus, investors who take advantage of weaker national 
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governments could potentially abuse the process. 
Lastly, confidential proceedings may be used to conceal 
any abuse of the system by foreign governments.236  “In the 
past six years, the World Bank received more than 2,000 
allegations of corruption and found a ‘recurring pattern of 
bribery, kickbacks, front companies, and shell companies.’”237  
Confidential arbitration proceedings, in an environment where 
the risk of corruption is allegedly prevalent, raise the 
possibility of illegal practices and fraud between governments 
and foreign companies.238  Critics argue that investors are able 
to use their rights to conspire with governments to force 
“dangerous investments on unwilling populations.”239 
For example, in the case of Metalclad v. Mexico,240 
Metalclad Corporation, an American waste disposal company, 
filed a complaint with ICSID alleging that the Mexican state 
of San Luis Potosí violated provisions of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement.  The Governor of San Luis Potosi 
prohibited Metalclad’s waste disposal plant after an 
environmental impact assessment revealed that the Metalclad 
facility site was an ecologically sensitive zone.241  Accordingly, 
Metalclad claimed that the Governor’s action expropriated 
Metalclad’s future profits, resulting in ninety million dollars in 
damages.242  However, the Mexican federal government 
allegedly encouraged Metalclad to pursue arbitration before 
ICSID in order to “‘force’ the government to open a waste 
disposal plant opposed by environmentalists.”243 
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Therefore, even though there are some benefits to 
maintaining confidentiality in arbitration proceedings, greater 
transparency is necessary for arbitration proceedings where 
the government is a party, as in all arbitrations before ICSID.  
Accordingly, the confidentiality rules of ICSID inappropriately 
permit private arbitrations to be conducted for claims 
involving public interests and harm the legitimacy of the 
ICSID institution. 
3. Inequitable and Excessive Award 
As investors continue to be successful in securing 
monetary awards through the arbitration process, the number 
of cases is rising significantly.244  “In 70% of the public 
decisions addressing the merits of the dispute, investors’ 
claims were accepted, at least in part.”245 
The prospect of winning excessive awards encourages 
investors to file claims under ICSID.  Accordingly, the vast 
majority of new cases filed in 2012 were filed by investors from 
developed countries against developing countries.246  In CME 
Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic,247 the investor was 
awarded significantly more than the actual value of the 
investment.248 In this case, the tribunal held that the Czech 
Republic violated the Czech-Netherlands BIT when the 
government amended their media regulatory controls.249  The 
tribunal then declared that the Czech Republic was 
responsible for CME’s losses and awarded the investor over 
$270 million.250  This award amount was calculated using a 
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discounted cash flow, which included the value of the investor’s 
actual investment, as well as forecasted cash flows.251  The 
tribunal’s decision placed a high financial cost on the Czech 
government to regain authority to enact new regulatory 
controls.252  Therefore, the investor’s award is often arguably 
inequitable as it not only prohibits a state from regulating key 
domestic affairs, but also potentially subjects the state to 
paying excessive monetary awards.253 
4. ICSID Annulment Mechanism 
There has been an emerging trend toward challenging 
international arbitration awards.254 As mentioned above, 
ICSID offers its own system of review by which a party can 
annul an award.255  However, annulment proceedings review 
only the legitimacy of the decision’s process.256  Unlike an 
appeal, an annulment does not review the substantive validity 
of the award rendered.257  Therefore, there is currently no cure 
for an award decided on a substantively invalid basis. 
While most states have complied with ICSID awards, in 
recent years, some states, including Argentina, Congo and 
Zimbabwe, have refused to comply with an award.258  Several 
procedural issues result from the States’ failure to comply with 
ICSID awards, which undermines “the value of ICSID 
arbitration as a meaningful mechanism for the resolution of 
investment disputes.”259 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
A. Modifications to Investment Agreements 
Investor rights and protections applied in investment 
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dispute settlements are most commonly established in 
investment agreements.260 Therefore, to change the investor-
state arbitration regime, it is necessary to first amend 
investment agreements to reconcile the business interests of 
foreign investors with the economic and sustainable 
development concerns of host countries.261  As mentioned 
above, investment agreements were historically created to 
provide foreign investors greater protection in foreign states.262  
However, recent evidence negates the reason for developing 
countries to join investment treaties.263  The presumed benefit 
of foreign direct investments for developing countries to aid in 
economic development has not been materializing because 
developing countries are pressured into negotiating broad 
investment liberalization rights.264 
Furthermore, these developing countries have been 
exposing themselves to the increased risks of international 
arbitrations.265  Therefore, investment treaties must make a 
fundamental shift to diminish the focus on investor rights and 
to expressly endorse sustainable development as the broader 
goal of investment agreements.266  The purpose of the 
investment regime must be altered to recognize that states 
have a right to pursue investments that ensure a positive 
contribution to their sustainable development.267 
To make this shift, investment agreements must expressly 
endorse sustainable development as a goal of the investment 
agreement, as opposed to only referring to the investor’s rights 
and protections.268  Including a binding obligation on the part 
of the foreign investor to protect human rights and the 
environment will transform the scope of the treaty to promote 
sustainable development.269  This shift in focus within the 
investment agreement will create a more balanced approach 
that recognizes state rights and responsibilities within the 
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presence of investor rights.270 
Currently, many investment agreements rely on vague 
terms, which are broadly interpreted to afford investors’ 
expansive rights.271  Investment treaties should therefore be 
amended to limit the scope of investors’ rights by using clear, 
definitive language.  The terms “investor” and “investment” 
should be clearly defined within the investment agreement to 
refer only to investments made by the particular private 
investor from one state within a foreign host state.272  
Narrowing the definitions of these terms will limit the 
arbitrator’s ability to widely interpret the scope of the 
investment agreement.273  Ultimately, this clarification will 
prevent investors from enforcing broad obligations on the host 
state and will reduce the risk to the host state by preventing a 
wide variety of unforeseeable investor claims. 
B. Reform the ICSID Arbitration Process 
In April 2006, ICSID made some limited changes to its 
arbitration rules.274  These amendments demonstrate that it is 
possible for ICSID to make the necessary adjustments to meet 
the evolving needs of investors and host countries.  While these 
changes were a step in the right direction, there have not been 
any additional changes to ICSID since 2006.275  The ICSID 
Administrative Council has the authority to amend ICSID 
Rules.276  Any revision must be consistent with the ICSID 
Convention and must be approved by a majority of two-thirds 
vote by the Administrative Council.277  With the growth of 
international investment agreements and the resulting growth 
of investor-state arbitrations, additional changes to the 
arbitration process are necessary to increase legitimacy and 
deter other countries from withdrawing from the ICSID 
Convention. 
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1. Revise Requirements for Arbitrator’s 
Qualification and Disclosure 
As mentioned above, a small clique of arbitrators typically 
decides investor-state dispute settlement cases.278  
Accordingly, the arbitrator’s potential conflict of interest and 
extravagant fees, undermines the arbitrator’s ability to make 
an unbiased and neutral decision.  The ICSID Arbitration 
Rules stipulating the required qualifications of the arbitrators 
should be revised to increase legitimacy and promote mutual 
confidence in the system. 
The ICSID Arbitration Rules should be amended to 
include more stringent restrictions regarding conflicts of 
interest.  The disclosure obligations stated in ICSID’s 
Arbitration Rules should list specific categories of information 
subject to disclosure by the arbitrator.279  For example, the rule 
should explicitly require disclosure of any social relationships 
between the arbitrator and lawyer, as well as any previous 
disputes in which the arbitrator was involved in with either 
party.280  The rule should also prohibit lawyers from crossing 
over roles as arbitrators in some disputes and advocates in 
other disputes.  An independent and transparent tribunal 
should solve investment disputes.281 
Additionally, Article 14 of the ICSID Convention, which 
addresses the required qualifications and knowledge of an 
arbitrator, should be revised to require that arbitrators be 
persons of recognized competence in the fields of both 
environmental and human rights law.282  Arbitrators 
possessing the expertise to address public interest disputes 
arising out of investments would enhance ICSID’s 
effectiveness and promote “mutual confidence” within the 
system. 
2. Increase Transparency 
Because the decisions of investor-state disputes could have 
significant impacts on broad public welfare issues, it is not 
appropriate for such cases to be resolved in privatized 
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commercial arbitration.  While the 2006 amendments to the 
ICSID Convention Rules improved transparency by permitting 
third parties to attend hearings and publication of the award, 
both of the new rules are dependent upon consent of the 
parties.283  In cases involving public interests, tribunals should 
be required to hold open hearings, disclose documents, and 
accept amicus briefs. 
Also, prior awards do not bind a tribunal, which creates 
the potential for contrasting results for the same issue.284  The 
lack of uniformity introduces a higher risk to both parties and 
ultimately threatens the legitimacy of ICSID.285  Increasing 
transparency will facilitate in the creation of precedent thereby 
allowing parties to more adequately set prices to allocate risk.  
Therefore, a system of precedent should be introduced to 
prevent inconsistencies and create a more predictable and 
apparently fair outcome. 
3. Create an Appeals Process 
While an award can be annulled for procedural 
inefficiencies, there is currently no recourse for rulings that are 
substantively flawed or inconsistent.286  The current 
annulment process is not able to reconcile any legal errors 
made in the resolution process.287  An appellate system should 
be created to permit the correction of legal errors “which might 
otherwise inappropriately bankrupt developing nations, stifle 
legitimate regulatory activity, or deprive investors of their 
legitimate expectations.”288 
4. Promote Mutual Confidence 
As foreign investors have initiated the vast majority of 
ICSID cases against developing countries, it is evident that 
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ICSID has successfully fulfilled its promise of affording greater 
investment protection.289  Although it is difficult to determine 
whether ICSID successfully contributed to increasing 
investment flow, it is evident ICSID tribunals have prioritized 
investment protections as they have predominantly engaged in 
settling disputes with foreign investors as claimants.290  While 
it is important to protect foreign investment to promote foreign 
investment flow, it is equally important to ensure the 
investment has a positive effect on the enhancement of the 
Third World’s development.291  Therefore, ICSID should 
concentrate on promoting “mutual confidence,” as this is a 
necessary element to maintain ICSID’s relevancy in 
developing countries.  To encourage “mutual confidence,” 
ICSID must consider ways to address the needs of the Third 
World.292 
5. Broaden the Investment Dispute Scope to 
Include Public Interest Analysis 
Since ICSID’s inception over forty years ago, international 
law has continuously changed and developed.293  International 
environmental law and human rights have evolved into a 
prominent area of international law today.294  Therefore, 
ICSID should consider extending the ICSID Convention’s 
scope of review to issues of international public interests.295  
ICSID tribunals should not refrain from considering 
developing countries’ interests if they constitute a “legal 
dispute arising directly out of an investment” as stipulated by 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.296  Addressing these 
issues, such as human rights, economic development or 
environmental issues, in the tribunal’s evaluation of the legal 
investment dispute would enhance ICSID’s legitimacy and 
encourage international cooperation for economic 
development.297 
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CONCLUSION 
The significant increase in the number of disputes within 
ICSID jurisdiction based on international investment 
agreements confirms the legitimacy of the investor-state 
dispute mechanism.  However, even though the number of 
cases initiated by developing countries increased in 2012, the 
majority of investment disputes originated from developed 
countries.  Given the arguments that the current international 
investment regime favors investors, amendments should be 
made to the international investment agreements and the 
ICSID Convention to establish mutual confidence of both 
investors and states that will stimulate foreign investment and 
enhance economic development. 
 
